Poverty trends across Brazilian states: the importance of education and left governance, 1987-2006 by Carlson, Sabrina M.
POVERTY TRENDS ACROSS BRAZILIAN STATES: THE IMPORTANCE
OF EDUCATION AND LEFT GOVERNANCE, 1987-2006
Sabrina M. Carlson
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in








SABRINA M. CARLSON: Poverty Trends Across Brazilian States: the
Importance of Education and Left Governance, 1987-2006
(Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn.)
It is no secret that Latin American poverty trends have long been troubling and
Brazil is no exception to this pattern. In this study, I examine poverty trends in
Brazil at the subnational level. To do so, I compiled cross-sectional time series data
for the 27 Brazilian states for the years 1987-2006. Using OLS regression models,
I examine the importance of left governance (at the national and subnational
levels) and educational attainment for poverty reduction. Results indicate that
both a leftist president and higher average years of educational attainment are
negatively related to poverty trends. From this, I conclude that the placement of
a left government in power at the executive level, as well as increasing the human
capital of the population, are critical for the reduction of poverty.
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Introduction
The objective of this study is to examine poverty trends across the Brazilian states
and subsequently identify its causal factors. Prior research holds that various
political, structural, and geographic factors affect poverty trends, such as social
spending, left party governance, education, GDP, unemployment, debt, inequality,
healthcare, regime type, etc. Based on previously identified causal factors and
effects, I am most interested in establishing the impact that educational attainment
and left party governance can have on poverty trends at the subnational level.
My first expectation with this research is that higher average years of educational
attainment has a significant, negative impact on poverty trends as previous studies
have shown that effective education policies can decrease poverty by ameliorating
productivity through improving the skill sets, qualifications, and human capital
of the population. In addition, previous studies have advanced the argument
that long-term left incumbency is associated with a more generous welfare state;
subsequently, I examine the importance of left parties for battling poverty. In
this regard, I expect to find that left incumbency in state parliaments, at the
state governor level, and in the federal presidency will have significant, negative
effects on poverty. It is important to examine the power of left parties at these
three levels of governance because Brazil has a high level of decentralization and
all three levels of governance share legislative social policymaking responsibilities
(Wilson 2006).
In particular, this study examines poverty trends across the Brazilian states
from 1987 to 2006.1 I perform an error correction model using OLS regression
with structural, political, and geographic variables and find that, while left party
governance at the state level is not significant, both higher average years of educa-
1 The dataset used in this study was built by Sandra Chapman and I.
tional attainment and the presence of a left president are significant findings and
the results indicate that they contribute to lower levels of poverty across Brazil.
More specifically, I find that the presence of a left party in power at the execu-
tive level, not at the state (governors or legislatures) level, is what matters for
direct poverty reduction; however, these findings might be specific to the current
president Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva as he has implemented a massive, successful
poverty elimination program (Bolsa Famı´lia) and therefore these findings might
not be transferable to all leftist presidents in general. The education findings
suggest that higher average years of schooling lead to lower poverty levels; more
specifically, a positive change upward in educational attainment has a negative,
significant relationship with poverty. This study reflects the growing awareness
on the importance of redistributive policies for poverty reduction (illustrated with
Lula’s presidency), as well as the increasing understanding on the importance of
improving the human capital of the workforce through increasing the average years
of education obtaining by the population.
This paper is broken up into several sections. I begin with a literature review
in which I discuss a brief history of Brazil and relevant information and arguments
about poverty, education, and left governance. This is followed by the presentation
of my hypotheses. I then turn to the methodology section, in which I detail the
error correction model, as well as the variables, dataset, and methods employed
in this study. The outline of the methodology is followed by the presentation
and interpretation of results, and the paper is concluded with a discussion of the
findings and suggested avenues for future research.
Brazil
During the 1980s, Brazil experienced a transition to democracy from a bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime. The transition to democracy was completed in 1989,2 with
2 The exact date of Brazil’s completed transition to democracy is somewhat disputed within
the literature as it can be argued that Brazil reached a full democracy in 1988 with the establish-
ment of a new constitution, or in 1986 with the first direct elections of state governors; however,
2
a direct presidential election, and after the establishment of the 1988 Constitution
of Brazil. This was a slow transition, which is often attributed to veto points,
a fragmented congress, strong and autonomous state governments, and a multi-
party system alongside open-list proportional representation; however, Brazil is
an interesting case in that, even in the midst of a weak and fragmented party
system, a divided congress, and a near fiscal crisis, the country still managed
to successfully impeach a corrupt president, resolve hyperinflation, and finally
achieve macro-economic stability a mere post-authoritarian rule (Fenwick 2008).
Brazil can be characterized by two distinct phases of performance since its
transition from authoritarian military rule. The first phase, from 1989 to 1993,
was characterized by corrupt and unstable governance, weak macroeconomic per-
formance, and severe hyperinflation. The second phase was inaugurated with the
introduction of the Plano Real in 1994, former President Fernando Henrique Car-
doso’s anti-inflation/macroeconomic stability plan, which was successful in dras-
tically reducing inflation and stabilizing the economy. The second phase was far
more successful than the first; inflation was kept low, the party system began to
consolidate, and political leadership became more stable (Power 2008). Moreover,
there was a successful, peaceful transition from Cardoso to current President Lula
Ina´cio da Silva (Lula) in 2003, whose administration has also been characterized
by macroeconomic stability and successful social programs.
Brazil is an interesting case study for several additional reasons. First, Brazil
is one of the world’s most populous countries with almost 180 million people and
is the largest country in Latin America (both geographically and demographi-
cally). Brazil is comprised of twenty-six states and one federal district and is
typically cited as being a highly decentralized country; all three of its levels of
government (federal, state, and municipal) have social policy legislating responsi-
bilities (Wilson 2006). Also, in contrast to other Latin American federations, the
state governments in Brazil have been significantly powerful (since the transition
I am using the date 1989 as this is when Brazil experienced a democratic presidential election.
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to democracy), with a substantial amount of autonomy over fiscal policymaking
(Borges 2008). Further, Brazil has the highest level of inequality in all of Latin
America (Gini=.567 in 2005), which is the region with the highest inequality rates
in the world. This matters for poverty because scholars and international finan-
cial institutions have consistently found inequality to be a serious constraint for
poverty reduction. It follows that it is an important endeavor to examine the
poverty levels in a country with an exceptionally high level of income inequality.
Finally, it is theoretically interesting to analyze poverty changes over time at the
subnational level in a country with autonomous and powerful state governments.
Latin American Poverty
Poverty is an ongoing problem and a severe setback to development in Latin Amer-
ica. This fact has been widely acknowledged within the literature; for example,
the World Bank advances that “poverty has long been recognized as one of the
more serious and lasting problems facing Latin America” (Pribble et al. 2009,
2). Various economists have indicated that the proportion of the Latin Ameri-
can population in poverty decreased in the 1990s, but has risen again in recent
years (Wodon et al. 2001). However, while poverty levels did fall in the 1990s,
this reduction was insubstantial; in fact, the average cross-national decline was
only 4 percentage points, dropping from 43 percent to 39 percent throughout
the decade. In an examination of household characteristics, the study “Poverty
in Latin America: Trends (1986-1998) and Determinants” displayed unfortunate
statistics on poverty trends in Latin America. They found that, in 1998, a third
of the population in Latin America was poor, and one sixth was extremely poor.
These numbers translate into 179 million poor people and 89 million extremely
poor people. More recent figures from the United Nations’ Economic Commission
on Latin America and the Caribbean indicate that in 2004, 41.7 percent of the
population in Latin America lived in poverty and an additional 17.4 percent lived
in extreme poverty (Pribble et al. 2009).
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Negative Effects of Poverty
Poverty-stricken individuals face difficulties in countless ways. One facet concerns
their ability to participate in the market, as the Inter-American Development
Bank argues, “the ability of poverty-stricken individuals to participate fully in the
economy is often very low as poverty is fundamentally linked to lack of access–by
control or ownership–to productive and financial assets” (IADB 1998). Moreover,
those with exceptionally low income are also disproportionately affected by, and
less capable of withstanding, economic crises (IADB 1998). Aside from lack of in-
come, other dimensions of poverty need to be considered and addressed as poverty
affects the people confined to it in more ways than their economic well-being.
Authors Alberto Minujin, Jan Vandemoortele, and Enrique Delamonica candidly
describe the unfortunate situation of living in poverty: “each year, 11 million
children under the age of five die as a result of preventable or easily treatable
disease and most of them belong to poor households. This may be the greatest
contemporary tragedy for humanity and a negation of the rights which we accept
almost unconsciously. For many of those who survive, their lives are full of diffi-
culties, occasionally condemning them to perpetual poverty”( Minujin et al 2002,
33). Further, those confined to urban slums in the region are more likely to be
victims of violent crime than more wealthy individuals. That the lives of poverty-
stricken individuals are negatively affected in considerable ways, it is all the more
important to identify the causal factors influencing poverty trends.
Poverty in Brazil
Brazil has achieved success in battling poverty (defined in Brazil as the percentage
of the population earning less than one-half of the minimum wage) in the past two
decades, due in part to macroeconomic stabilization plans and conditional-cash
transfers; however, poverty levels still remain uncomfortably high in the country
(17.2 percent in 2007). Figure 1 depicts the poverty trend throughout Brazil as
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a whole during the period 1987-2007. This figure shows that the poverty trend
in Brazil remains high, but that the poverty level has been decreasing in recent
years. This figure is unsurprising as it illustrates that the trend coincides with
former President Cardoso’s anti-hyperinflation Plano Real, and President Lula’s
Bolsa Famı´lia program.3
Prior to Presidents Cardoso and Lula, the 1980s were marked by tumultuous
macroeconomic stability and widespread hyperinflation (Fenwick 2009). Figure
1 clearly illustrates this, as it shows poverty levels from 1987 to 1993 varying
between 32 and 36 percent. Figure 1 also shows the direct effects of Cardoso’s
Plano Real. Plano Real, introduced in 1994, succeeded in dropping the poverty
level within the country from 35.52 percent in 1993 to 26.54 percent in 1995
with a simultaneous decline in the level of extreme poverty from 19.5 to 14.5
percent. These figures translate into 10 million people being lifted out of poverty
with another 6 million overcoming extreme poverty (IADB 2005). In general, the
Plano Real was victorious in rapidly mitigating hyperinflation and in achieving
macroeconomic stability, with poverty reduction following suit. Per-capita income,
on average, also increased by 25 percent as a result of Plano Real; however, these
rapid economic improvements drastically slowed after inflation was curtailed in
1995 and poverty reduction came to a halt for the time being. The poverty level
(26 percent of the population) remained roughly the same between 1995 and 2002
(IADB 2005).
3 Bolsa Famı´lia is the flagship program of the Lula Administration. This social program
replaced four previously social existing programs: Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentaca˜o, Auxillo
Ga´s, and Carta˜o Alimentaca˜o; the government unified all four programs under Bolsa Famı´lia
to expand poverty-reduction effects through providing monetary benefits to qualifying families
each month. The national government reached its 2003 goal of 11.1 million poor families in
2006 (Fenwick 2009). Very unfortunately, the Bolsa Famı´lia data is unavailable; therefore, it
is difficult to discern whether these findings are due to a left president in general or the Bolsa
Familia program. The data for this program is held by the Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social
e Combate a Fome; however, the only data available to the public for Bolsa Famı´lia is for the year
2005. Contact has been made with the Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome,
but the data has not yet been received and will not be received in sufficient time. Furthermore,
without this data, it is difficult to parse out whether the effect that I am finding with a left
president (since there has only been one during the period under which this study takes place)
can be attributed to having a left president in power in general, or whether this finding is specific
to President Lula and his flagship poverty alleviation program Bolsa Famı´lia.
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Ending inflation, however, provided to be only a short-lived, one-time benefit
for socioeconomic issues. In order for Brazil’s high levels of both poverty and in-
equality to continue in their decline, regular improvements in wages, employment,
education, and social policy need to be achieved and/or maintained (Kingstone
and Power 2008). Fortunately, President Lula assumed office in 2003 post-Cardoso
and immediately advocated a poverty-reduction agenda. From 2003 to 2006, Lula
and his administration made it their principal objective to augment the purchas-
ing power of Brazilians through increasing the minimum wage and implementing
targeted social policies. Lula won the 2003 general presidential election with 61.3
percent of the vote; equipped with this electoral support, Lula was able to push for
social policy reform to address issues of poverty and disparate other social needs
(Fenwick 2009). Lula’s success in combating poverty can also be seen in Figure 1
as it is clearly shown here that poverty was reduced from a level of 26.67 percent in
2003 to 17.21 percent in 2007, coinciding directly with Lula’s first administration
and therefore his trademark poverty alleviation program Bolsa Famı´lia.
Figure 2, in turn, depicts poverty trends across a sample of six Brazilian states,
three of which have the highest average levels of poverty throughout the period
1987-2007 (Alagoas, Maranha˜o, and Piau´ı), while the remaining three have had
the lowest average levels of poverty throughout the same time period (Sa˜o Paulo,
Santa Catarina, Rio de Janeiro). Figure 2 helps to illustrate that poverty trends
do vary across the states. For example, the three states with the highest average
poverty rates from 1987-2007 are currently at the following levels: Alagoas 48.74
percent, Maranha˜o 48.24 percent, and Piau´ı 43.32 percent, whereas the three
states with the lowest average poverty rates are currently at the following levels:
Sa´o Paulo 10.61 percent, Santa Catarina 7.03 percent, and Rio de Janeiro 13.26
percent.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Brazilian Population Living in Poverty
Source: IPEA





































Fig. 2: Poverty Across Brazilian States
Decentralization
One of my expectations with this study is that Brazil’s federal system would en-
able left parties to have a significant impact on poverty reduction at both the
federal and state levels.4 The existing theoretical frameworks advancing the ar-
4 It is my expectation that the municipal level in Brazil can be important for poverty reduction;
however, the exploration of this is beyond the scope of this study.
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gument that left parties are linked to generous welfare states are typically applied
to the national level; therefore, this macro-level theory cannot be readily trans-
ferred to the subnational level without further investigation into Brazil’s system
of decentralization.
The inner-workings of Brazil’s decentralization lend credence to the idea that
left parties can be effective at both the federal and state levels. Brazil is typically
cited as having a high level of decentralization with exceptionally autonomous
states (Fenwick 2009). In Brazil, the federal, state, and municipal governments
share social policymaking responsibilities, yet no one level is specifically charged
with authority over these matters (Wilson 2006). The 1988 Constitution devolved
substantial policy and resource control to the lower levels of government, in reac-
tion to the previous centralized system under the military rule. It has been ar-
gued that Brazil’s strong federalism allows powerful state governors to constantly
compete with the national government to continuously push for both additional
political and fiscal autonomy (Fenwick 2008, Borges 2008). The 1988 Consti-
tution devolved administrative and functional responsibilities to the subnational
governments. Further, it called for a new tax system wherein the subnational
governments were given both new tax powers and a larger share of federal tax
revenues (IADB 2006).
On the other hand, while the 1988 Constitution did initiate further decen-
tralization post-authoritarian rule, the Constitution also concentrated additional
social policymaking responsibilities in the executive. In the 1990s, President Fer-
nando Henrique Cardoso encouraged the recentralization of macroeconomic poli-
cymaking. Also, the Brazilian president has a great deal of authority over the bud-
getmaking process (Rodden and Arretche 2004). Further, Figueiredo and Limongi
argued in 2000 that Brazilian presidents have been very successful in enacting
their legislative agendas. For instance, between 1989 and 1997, 78 percent of the
bills introduced by the president were approved and later enacted (Figueiredo and
Limongi 2000).
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In terms of poverty alleviation in particular, Article 23 of the 1988 Constitu-
tion clearly mandates a role for the federal government, the states, and municipal
levels of government, yet this is also stipulated as common power between three
disparate levels of governance (IADB 2006). Clearly, as described above, the
Brazilian system is neither fully decentralized nor centralized. The IADB states
this phenomenon best, “the Brazilian political system can be characterized nei-
ther as purely decentralized nor as a purely concentrated system. While some
features such as electoral rules, a multiparty system, and federalism act towards
decentralizing the political system, other features such as the internal rules of the
decision-making process in Congress, the constitutional powers of the president,
and his capacity to selectively distribute policy and financial resources...act to-
wards centralizing it” (IADB 2006, 17). Consequently, Brazil’s strong federalism
suggests that the possibility exists for both the federal and state governments to
effectively influence poverty trends.
Education
As discussed, I expect that educational attainment is important for poverty reduc-
tion. In addition to the Pribble et al. 2009 study, countless additional research
has advanced arguments for the importance of education for poverty reduction
(see Borgess 2008, Brown and Hunter 2004, IADB 2002, IADB 2005, Wodon et
al. 2001). Consequently, it is a serious matter that Latin American countries
lag behind most regions in educational attainment. For instance, in 2002, “the
average years of schooling attained by the population aged older or 25 in Latin
America was approximately 6 years of schooling. With averages over 11 years in
the United States, Canada, and Sweden, attainment in these countries is twice the
Latin American average” (IADB 2002, 8). Though Latin America does lag behind
in educational progress, the countries in this region have made gains since 1980
in ensuring higher school attendance; in recent years (2000-2004), the majority of
children in the region enroll and complete primary school, while post-primary ed-
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ucation has also increased, to almost one-third of the region’s population (Damon
and Glewwe 2007).
Some Latin American countries have been more successful with education than
others; unfortunately, Brazil has been one of the less-successful countries in the
region, especially with the education of its poor population. As of 2005, more than
two-thirds of the poor in Brazil have attained only four years of education or less
(IADB 2005). Throughout the entire Brazilian population, the average years of
education completed by adults aged 25 or older is 6.5 years (again, considerably
lower than the average of 11 years in the United States, Canada, and Sweden).
The Inter-American Development Bank author Carlos Herra´n has found an inverse
relationship between poverty and the education level of the head of household; he
explains “the probability of being poor is 50 percent for households where the head
has less than four years of education, this probability is drastically reduced (to less
than 25 percent) when the household head has completed primary education (eight
years) and is practically zero for household heads with post-secondary education”
(IADB 2005, 15).
The strongest argument advocating the importance of education for poverty
reduction is a human capital one. Numerous studies and reports for decades have
cited the significant impact education has on poverty reduction. An influential
report prepared by the World Bank in 1995 entitled “Poverty and Income In-
equality in Latin America during the 1980s” advanced the notion that educational
attainment has the greatest relationship with both income inequality and poverty.
This report illustrates well the importance of education for supressing poverty.
The argument is that educational attainment has indirect effects on poverty as
higher average levels of education increases human capital and subsequently re-
duces income inequality, increases productivity, increases the probability of the
poor acquiring better-paid jobs, etc. Further, this report holds that labor produc-
tivity is the main determinant of poverty, and that education (through its ability
to augment productivity) may well be the most powerful tool for reducing poverty,
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increasing economic growth, decreasing income inequality, and improving Brazil’s
position in the world market (IADB 2002).
Education in Brazil
The reasons for examining education at the subnational level in Brazil are twofold.
First, average levels of educational attainment vary across states. For instance,
the average years of education in 2005 was 4.23 in Alagoas, 4.48 in Maranha˜o, 7.14
in Santa Catarina, and 6.44 in Mato Grosso. Second, Brazil has a strong tradition
of subnational control over schooling as states and municipal governments have
the main responsibility for providing basic education. The 1988 Constitution de-
centralized Brazil’s education system by delegating both fiscal and administrative
educational authority to the state and municipal levels (Gordon and Vegas 2005).
As a result, as early as the mid-1990s, states and municipalities were responsible
for 80 percent of total education expenditures (Borges 2008, IADB 2006).5 The
argument is made that Brazil lags behind its Latin America neighbors strictly be-
cause its educational system lacks intergovernmental coordination and because the
national government has retreated from the center of the education system (Borges
2008). It follows from this line of logic that strong subnational control over the
educational system and lack of intergovernmental coordination has contributed to
a Brazilian trend of policy fragmentation in the field of education and subsequent
variation in educational attainment across states. Accordingly, it is not surpris-
ing that average years of education varies across Brazilian states, underlining the
importance of including data for each state in this study.
Figure 3 depicts a sample of six Brazilian states to highlight the variation in
5 There is one important federal educational mandate, which is the Fundo para Manutenca˜o
e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e Valorizaca˜o do Magiste´rio (Fund for Maintenance
and Development of the Fundamental Education and Valorization of Teaching) or simply the
FUNDEF as it is widely known. The FUNDEF is a federal mandate, established in 1998, which
stipulates the creation of a common state fund into which both states and municipalities are
required to contribute a portion of their tax revenues. This state fund is then redistributed
to the state and municipal governments on the basis of the number of students enrolled in the
basic educational systems. Accordingly, the primary intent of this reform is to address spending
inequalities within states, not necessarily across the entire country (Gordon and Vegas 2005).
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educational attainment across the country. Alagoas, Piau´ı, Maranha˜o are shown
because they are the three Brazilian states with the lowest average levels of educa-
tional attainment across the country, while Amapa´, Sa˜o Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro
are the three states with the highest average levels of educational attainment. Fig-
ure 3 highlights numerous facts concerning Brazilian education. First, it is clear
from this figure that average years of education have been consistently increasing
throughout the country since 1987 (from an average level of 4.5 in 1987 to 6.74
in 2006). Second, even though education has indeed been increasing, educational
attainment is still considerably low. Third, it is clear from Figure 3 that average
educational attainment varies across the Brazilian states. For instance, in 2006,
the level of average years of schooling was 4.69 in Piau´ı, 4.81 in Maranha˜o, 4.678





























Fig. 3: Average Years of Education Across Brazilian States
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Left Governance
As previously delineated, prior research has underlined the importance of left gov-
ernance for the welfare state; accordingly, I want to ascertain whether or not left
party power has a negative and significant relationship with poverty both at the
federal and subnational level in Brazil. Several studies have previously established
a connection between left party governance and a more generous welfare state
and a subsequent decline in poverty. A clear example is that of Pribble et al.
in which the authors cite evidence suggesting that left parties structure welfare
policies to benefit specifically those people in lower-income brackets. In addition,
left parties favor such social programs as investment in primary and secondary
education, as well as universal healthcare. Upon examining left party weight in
legislatures across 18 different Latin American countries, the authors find support
for their hypothesis as they conclude that the weight of long-term left incumbency
in the legislature has a negative, significant effect on poverty (Pribble et al. 2009).
In general, previous scholars have underscored the importance of left parties in
government for engendering a generous welfare state through a greater commit-
ment to social programs, addressing social needs, etc. As such, I want to explore
whether or not left power (federal and subnational, as discussed) has a significant
and negative effect on poverty as the left is found to favor investments in human
capital, improving education, progressive policies, etc.
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis in this study is that higher average years of educational at-
tainment will have a negative and significant relationship with poverty. I expect
that education will matter at the subnational level because Brazil is typically
cited as having a highly decentralized education system (Borges 2008). The sec-
ond basic hypothesis is that left governance has a significant, negative effect on
poverty; more specifically, I hypothesize that the presence of left parties at the
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state level (legislatures and governors) and in the federal presidency negatively
impact poverty. As described above, the inspiration for these expectations comes
from a 2008 study by authors Huber, Pribble, and Stephens wherein the authors
performed a cross-national comparison of 18 Latin American countries and found
that democracy, left party weight, and investment in human capital had signifi-
cant, negative effects on poverty (Pribble et al. 2009). I have become interested
in determining whether or not these findings can be transferred to the subnational
level in Brazil. It is my expectation that long-term left power6 in Brazil’s state
legislatures, as well as leftist governors, will lead to a reduction in poverty as nu-
merous scholars have pointed to Brazil as being a highly decentralized country
(Stepan 2001, Souza 1997, Kingstone and Power 2008, Hunter and Power 2007,
Fenwick 2009). However, I also expect a leftist president in Brazil to be impor-
tant for poverty reduction throughout the years 1987-2006 as this time period
saw the successful implementation of a federal poverty-alleviation program Bolsa
Famı´lia. Accordingly, my expectation in regard to left parties is that long-term
left governance at the state level (legislatures and governors) and/or in the federal
presidency will have a negative, significant effect on poverty trends in Brazil.
Methods
For this paper, I use cross-sectional time series data for the 27 Brazilian states for
the years 1987-2006 to test changes in poverty rates over time. With pooled data
of this sort, there are commonly cited methodological problems, such as autocor-
relation (as there can be systematic variation across states or years), bias, and
inefficient estimates. One of the most common fixes offered to resolve these prob-
lems is the incorporation of fixed effects into the model. Proponents of fixed-effects
models make the argument that it is utterly essential to include unit dummies so
6 By long-term, I necessarily mean beginning in 1987 as this is the first year included in the
dataset. The measure for left power I use is an accumulated measure of the proportion of seats
held by left parties in state legislatures, thereby gauging both duration and weight of left party
power. Hereafter, I will refer to this as ‘left power’ for simplicity’s sake.
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as to hold every unit constant in order to avoid spuriousness and instead be sure
that the ‘true’ effect of each explanatory variable on the variable of interest has
been identified (Beck and Katz 1995). However, those opposing this method insist
that these unit dummies eliminate far too much variation across units; this results
in a serious problem, especially in the subfield of comparative politics where the
interest typically lies exactly in the variation across units.
The use of fixed effects may be appropriate in some research; however, this
approach is not always either necessary or desirable. Plu¨mper et al., in their 2005
piece “Panel Data Analysis in Comparative Politics: Linking Method to Theory,”
make the argument that the inclusion of unit dummies is not always necessary.
The authors maintain that theory needs to be linked to method in that “if the
theory says something about level effects on levels or on changes, a fixed effects
specification is not the model at hand. If a theory predicts level effects, one should
not include unit dummies. In these cases, allowing for a mild bias resulting from
omitted variables [i.e. omitting unit dummies] is less harmful than running a fixed
effects specification” (Plu¨mper et al. 2005, 334) as the fixed effects completely
absorb cross-unit variation. I am convinced by the argument advanced by Plu¨mper
et al. and according have decided upon an error-correction model for this study
which uses panel-corrected standard errors and allows for the examination of short
and long-term effects without the inclusion of fixed-effects. Upon considering that
the goal of this paper is to identify causal patterns and variation across states, it
makes little sense to include dummies which hold all states constant and eliminates
variation across states.
Error Correction Model
The error correction model (ECM) is not widely used, though it is becoming more
so.7 An ECM uses OLS regression with panel data, and uses panel-corrected stan-
7 The argument has recently been made that the ECM is appropriate for both stationary
and cointegration data. Keele and DeBoef, among others, have demonstrated a proof of the
equivalence between the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) and the ECM. It follows from
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dard errors to correct for correlation across units. The panel-corrected standard
errors help the researcher to be more conservative in their inferences about the
results as panel-corrected standard errors are larger than regular standard errors
(and therefore it is more difficult to achieve statistical significance with panel-
corrected standard errors). ECMs are extremely useful for cross-sectional time
series data as they allow for a tighter link between theory and model in allowing
researchers to test for both short and long term effects of causal processes (De Boef
and Keele, 2008). The most basic understanding of this model is the following:
“the term error correction model applies to any model that directly estimates the
rate at which Y changes to return to equilibrium after a change in X (which can
be either a short- or long-term effect)” (De Boef and Keele 2008, 9).
The ECM is extremely useful for dynamic specifications as it allows the re-
searcher to include short and long term effects. If an independent variable has a
short-term effect on Y, this impact can be captured immediately in an ECM; if
an independent variable has a long-term effect on Y, this effect will be distributed
across future time periods and this will also be captured in the model. In general,
the error correction model is the superior one to use for this study because it allows
me to correct for correlation across units, and to estimate the dynamics of both
short- and long-run effects on poverty.
To use an ECM, one regresses a ‘differenced’8 dependent variable on a lagged
level of the dependent variable, and a lag and differenced variable for every in-
dependent variable.9 An example: I regress the first difference of poverty on
one lagged level of poverty (X1), one lag of the gini coefficient (X2), and the first
difference of the gini coefficient (X3). Let’s say the coefficients are as follows:
.2X1, .4X2, .3X3. The coefficients are interpreted as follows: a one unit increase
in the gini coefficient will result in an immediate change in the poverty level in the
their argument and proof that the ECM need not be limited to cointegration data, but that it
is indeed well-suited for stationary data as well. This is relevant to this paper as I incorporate
both stationary and integrates series into the ECM (Keele and DeBoef 2006).
8 ‘Differencing’ calculates the change in a variable from the previous period to the current
period
9 The structure of the error correction model is ∆Y=α0-α1(Yt−1-βXt−1)+β0∆Xt+t
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amount of .3. This one-unit increase in the gini coefficient also has a long-term
effect; however, the interpretation of this effect is not as straightforward. The
interpretation of the coefficient for X2 involves a long-run multiplier, which is the
total effect of X2 on Y at a rate of 1-X1 (β1 / α1). The long-run multiplier itself is
the ratio of two coefficients: X2/X1 (or, in this case, it is a ratio of the gini coeffi-
cient lag/poverty lag). Thus, the total effect of X2 on Y (as a result of a one-unit
change in the gini coefficient) is 2 (.4X2/.2X1), which is distributed over future
time periods at a rate of .8 (1-.2X1), which is the speed of adjustment (1-α1).
It makes both theoretical and statistical sense for me to use an ECM. As
described above, the ECM is extremely useful for modeling dynamics. This is
appropriate for this study as the relationship between poverty and many of its
causal factors is inherently dynamic and as such it makes theoretical sense that
certain independent variables would have both short and long term effects on
poverty trends. I have also included an OLS regression model with panel-corrected
standard errors in order to demonstrate the robustness of my results. As I will
describe in more detail later in the paper, the significant findings produced from
the ECM maintain their significance in both models. Finally, it makes statistical
sense to employ an ECM since several of my variables are integrated time series.10
Variables
The measure of poverty used in this analysis is an estimate of the percentage of
the population living in poverty, which is defined by the Brazilian government as
10 An integrated time series is one in which old shocks, impacts, effects, etc. never leave the
system; instead, their effect will persist throughout time. Educational attainment is an integrated
time series because this measure is expected to continuously increase and never retract; each of
the four left measures are integrated series because they are accumulated and necessarily will
never retract. Integrated time series data can only be handled by ‘differencing’ the variable,
meaning that the only way to employ an integrated time series is to measure the change from
one period to the next in the variable. However, most of my variables actually do pass standard
Dickey-Fuller tests for integration, yet because of the cumulative nature of many of my variables,
it is best to that they are near-integrated at best.
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making 50 percent or less than the minimum wage.11 The independent variables
included in the error correction model are comprised of various social, economic,
and structural factors that are likely to affect poverty. The error correction model
contains social security/welfare spending as a percentage of GDP, a measure of
federal funding in the form of FPE (a redistributive measure from the federal to
state governments) as a portion of GDP, percentage of the labor force in industry,
left party weight in the state parliaments, accumulated years of left majorities in
state legislatures, measures of the presence of left governors and left presidents,
average years of education, the percentage of the rural population, gini coefficients
for each of the Brazilian states, and per capita household income as independent
variables. The panel-corrected standard error model uses these same explantory
variables, as well as two additional social spending variables (education 12 and
health/sanitation spending as percentages of GDP) and a measure of GDP itself.13
There are certain variables that were excluded from both models. 14
It is important to include measures of social spending so as to capture the
economic commitment the Brazilian states have to different sorts of social needs.
Furthermore, “spending patterns and the design of social welfare programs have
an impact on poverty levels in Latin America” (Pribble et al 2009, 7). In order
to estimate the social spending levels, the raw spending data from the Ministerio
11 This is the only measure of poverty available. Unfortunately, there is not an available
measure of relative poverty (such as purchasing power) at the state level in Brazil.
12 The education spending measures includes spending on ‘culture,’ and there is not an obvious
way to disaggregate the two that I have come across.
13 These additional variables were excluded from the error-correction model for multicollinear-
ity purposes. In performing a VIF (variance inflation factor) test for the full error-correction
model, the education spending, healthcare spending, and GDP growth variables exceeded the
standard cut-off point for multicollinearity (a VIF of 10) and were subsequently dropped from
the model. Excluding these variables from the model did nothing to change the results. Multi-
collinearity was not a problem in the panel-corrected standard error model (as their VIF numbers
were within the accepted standard of the discipline), thus education and health spending and
GDP were also included in this model. Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix display the VIF scores
for both the ECM and the PCSE.
14 A measure for race was also not included. Unfortunately, the only data available for race
is census data for the years 1991 and 2000. These are not enough data points to confidently
interpolate missing data. In the future, there are several additional variables that I hope to
include, such as national inflation rates, additional measures of federal transfers, state debt, and
of course Bolsa Famı´lia.
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de Fazenda was first collected for each state and two different measures of spend-
ing were subsequently calculated. The first measure gauged constant currency
spending per capita, which enabled the comparison of spending per capita in dif-
ferent regions over time. To ensure constant currency, the International Monetary
Fund Brazilian GDP deflator was applied, which is the method that the Instituto
de Pesquisa Econmica Aplicada utilizes in constructing measures of GDP. There
is a necessary assumption made in using this method-that inflation is constant
across all states. This is probably untrue, but the assumption must be made in
this research paper because calculating a deflator for each individual state is an
exceptionally difficult task.
The second measure constructed is social spending as a percentage of GDP,
which also uses the constant currency measure of spending because state GDP is
only available in constant currency units.15 This measure is important to include
because it gives a rough estimate of the proportion of market productivity of the
state that is allocated to social spending. With this measure, it is possible to
compare effort exerted by the different states in that states with lower levels of
GDP will have less to spend on social programs, but it is possible that they are
applying the same level of effort. In examining the proportion of their GDP that
is allocated to social spending, it is possible to which states dedicate a higher
percentage of their GDP to social programs.
Pribble et al. extend the idea of using years of education as a proxy for a
measure for the effectiveness of education policy. Their argument is that Latin
American policies are often criticized for being corrupt and ineffective, and that
even if a large amount of social spending money is dedicated to education spend-
ing in particular, it might not actually make a difference in education policies or
programs. In order to gauge the effectiveness of educational provisions and poli-
cies, the authors measure years of education instead of education spending. Years
15 As health and education are long-term investments in infrastructure, I use an accumulated
average (instead of raw spending) as a percentage of GDP for each of these two measures (Pribble
et al. 2009).
22
of education can act as a proxy for policy effectiveness because, as the authors
explain, the average amount of years of education indicates whether or not a pro-
gram or policy has been effective. Accordingly, one can measure the effectiveness
of education policies (increasing subsidies, investing in training for teachers in low-
income schools, improving the quality of education in numerous ways, etc.) by
whether or not they increase the average years of education (Pribble et al. 2009).
Further (and most importantly), measuring years of education is the best fit for
the argument of this paper as I am advancing the notion that higher average years
of education in a population will lead to a reduction in poverty. The measure in
this study gauges the average years of education achieved among the population
aged 25 years or older, in each state.
The Fundo de Participaca˜o dos Estados (FPE) is a redistributive measure
from the federal Brazilian government to the state governments. The central
government takes 21 percent of the federal incomes taxes and redistributes it to
the different states, which is allocated based on the population and economic
need of the specific state (Samuels 2003, IADB 2006). This is the most important
measure of federal funding as an entire fifth of federal income taxes is redistributed
to the states through this FPE;16 further, the states have a substantial amount
of discretion in how they spend this funding, as only 10 percent of FPE transfers
are mandated to be specifically allocated to certain programs (Mainwaring and
Samuels 1999). The measure in this model calculates the FPE as a portion of a
state’s GDP. This estimate gauges how much of the total public spending of the
state comes from need-based funds from the federal government. The expectation
is that states with higher percentages of FPE to GDP will be poorer states in
that a larger portion of their GDP is dependent upon money from the federal
16 It is also the most feasible federal funding data for me to use in this study. Ideally, I would
have exact measures of total federal funding to states; however, this data is incredibly difficult to
parse out. There seem to be several smaller disparate sources of federal funding; however, as of
yet, it is unclear to me as to how these are allocated, on which bases they are allocated, for what
purposed are they redistributed, etc. Thus, I have only included a measure of FPE. However, I
am confident that this measure accurately gauges federal funding to states as an entire fifth of
federal income tax is redistributed to the states in this way.
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government, which is based on the socio-economic needs of the population. Table
3 in the appendix displays federal FPE funding to the states as a percentage of the
states’ GDP. Keeping in mind the three states with the highest average poverty
rates (Alagoas, Maranha˜o, and Piau´ı) and the three states with the lowest average
poverty rates (Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina, and Sa˜o Paulo), it is evident that
FPE funding varies across states, and that FPE as a percent of GDP is higher
among the poorest states than the more wealthy ones.
Left party weight is an important variable in the dataset and is used to estimate
the weight of left party governance in each state’s parliament for each year. As
previously described, prior research suggests that the welfare state is more generous
when left parties control government for longer periods of time, and thus I want
to see how this relates to poverty. This measure was constructed using Huber and
Stephens’ measure of party codings, following Coppedge (Pribble et al. 2009).
To estimate left party weight, the number of seats held by left or center left
parties as a percentage of the total number of seats for each year (in each state’s
parliament) was calculated. State parliament elections are held in October, so this
measure calculates left party weight from the outcome of the October elections,
and applies this number to the beginning of the following year. The final measure
for left party weight was a cumulative estimate for the left party weight from
each year. This final, accumulated measure enables me to capture both relative
weight and length of left governance in the state legislatures. I have an additional
measure for left governance in the state legislatures, which is a cumulative measure
of left majorities in state legislatures. In this regard, I thought it important to
determine whether or not the left must have a majority (as opposed to simply
being represented) in order to have a substantial impact in policymaking. This
measure then estimates the number of years total in which the left has had a
majority in the legislatures in a given state.
I include a measure for state governors, which estimates whether a left governor
was in power in a given state, which was then accumulated in order to measure
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the total numer of years a state has been represented by a left governor. The final
measure of left governance is for the executive level. To estimate this, I include a
dichotomous variable gauging whether or not a left president was in office.17
I include an estimate of the percent of the labor force in industry, as this is
a commonly used variable in poverty studies. The logic is such that industry
workers tend to earn higher wages and are less likely to be in poverty than are
agricultural workers. The gini coefficient (a calculation of income inequality) is
included in the model to gauge inequality across Brazil. This is a measure of
the gini coefficient calculated for each state in each year.18 It is important to
include a measure of inequality when examining poverty because countless studies
conclude that inequality causes poverty. It is commonly argued that inequality is
a constraint to economic growth and poverty reduction (IADB 2005) and as such,
it is necessary to incorporate a measure of income inequality into the model.
The variable for income is per capita household income, which is measured in
constant currency units. This is calculated from household surveys, wherein the
income level for each household is gathered and then divided by the total number of
working adults in the household. Thus, this gives an average measure of income for
each state based on household surveys. Including a measure of income is important
because it estimates how well off individuals are in each state, and higher income
levels are typically associated with lower poverty levels. The variable for GDP
is a measure of each state’s economic performance. GDP is often included as an
explantory variable in poverty studies as scholars have typically associated better
economic perfomance with lower levels of poverty.
The final variable included in the model is a measure of rural population. 19 It
17 This estimate is synonymous with a measure for Lula, as he is the only left president Brazil
has seen since 1987.
18 However, it is unknown if the gini coefficient for each state was calculated by the state itself
or if the different gini coefficients were calculated by a common source. It could be problematic
if the ginis were calculated by each state as they might be biased, or some states might be
better equipped to measure income inequality more accurately than others. However, every gini
coefficient comes from the same datasource (IBGE microdata) and as such it seems likely that
they were all calculated from this source.
19 There is a good deal of missing population data, which was handled with data interpolation.
The first step to measuring the rural population in each state was to gather census data. The
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important to include rural population as “poverty tends to be higher in rural than
in urban areas. The headcount of extreme poverty is three times higher in rural
than in urban areas. For total poverty, the headcount is twice higher in rural areas”
(Wodon et al. 2001, 135). Moreover, World Bank statistics indicated that, in
2001, approximately 50 percent of the poverty-stricken population resides in rural
areas; the Bank contributes rural poverty to poor resources, a poorly developed
agricultural system, limited technology use, and low productivity rates, among
other factors. The rural population in Brazil typically depends on traditional
agriculture, livestock, and cash crops for their income; moreoever, workers in rural
areas are primarly small landholders, tenants, sharecroppers, or landless workers
(World Bank March 2001). Further, as of 2001, “90 percent of rural households
lacked adequate water supply, 57 percent lacked proper santitation facilities, and
73 percent of rural heads of households earn one minimum salary or less per month”
(World Bank 2001, 2).
Data
Brazil has excellent data at the subnational level and the data for this study
comes from numerous places: the Census Bureau, Huber and Stephens, IPEA,
IBGE, AND TSE. The Census Bureau was utilized to measure the population
and proportion of rural population in each Brazilian state. Huber and Stephens’
party codings, an extension of Coppedge’s project, were used to measure left party
weight. Coppedge’s work questioned country experts in 11 Latin America to cat-
egorize the parties that challenged elections in the lower house or constituent
assemblies as far back as 1912. Upon considerations of social and economic policy
population census took place in 1983, 1987, 1991, 1996, and 2000, so there is technically missing
data on the population size for the years the census did not take place. However, interpolation
was a simple fix to this problem. For the years between 1983 and 1987, an average was taken
from the population size of 1983 and 1987 and interpolated for the missing years in between.
This same calculation was applied to the all of the missing years throughout the dataset. Next,
the rural population data was divided by the population data in order to obtain a measure of
the percentage of people living in rural areas in each state so as to be able to compare across
states.
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positions, Coppedge classified parties along a left-right ideological range; this cat-
egorization was then further divided into five disparate groupings: left, center-left,
center, center-right, and right. Huber and Stephens adopt Coppedge’s method
and coding and extend it to include present-day parties and parties in lower-house
elections (Pribble et al. 2009 13-14).
The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) and the Instituto de
Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) are two government websites that contain
data on various economic, demographic, and social characteristics, which were
used to gather data on spending, income, poverty, inequality, water, and funds
from the federal government. The Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) is a Brazilian
government website that was used to collect data on the outcome of elections. For
any years that were missing from TSE, data was collected from Jairo Nicolau.
Nicolau has compiled a dataset on party affiliations in Brazilian state elections.
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Results
Table 1: ECM with Measures of all Left
Estimate PCSE t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -.0247477 .047901 -0.52 0.605
Lagged Poverty Level -.0838104 .0249281 -3.36 0.001
Educational Attainment ∆ -.0256016 .0093168 -2.75 0.006
Educational Attainment Lag .0014757 .0036588 0.40 0.687
Left in Legislature ∆ .0228301 .0200322 1.14 0.254
Left in Legislature Lag -.0036697 .0039698 -0.92 0.179
Left Governor ∆ -.0066552 .0048528 -1.37 0.170
Left Governor Lag .0008059 .0008747 0.92 0.357
Left Majority ∆ .0015945 .0062849 0.25 0.800
Left Majority Lag .0000509 .0009788 0.05 0.958
Lula ∆ -.0051978 .0065408 -0.79 0.427
Lula Lag -.0071802 .0029179 -2.46 0.014
Gini ∆ .3498687 .0558425 6.27 0.000
Gini Lag .1550996 .0662941 2.34 0.019
SS/GDP ∆ .0027124 .0239553 0.11 0.910
SS/GDP Lag -.0564408 .1861383 -0.30 0.762
FPE/GDP ∆ .153218 .0918062 1.67 0.095
FPE/GDP Lag .0252525 .0292725 0.86 0.388
Industry ∆ -.3370915 .1279515 -2.63 0.008
Industry Lag .0107466 .0513409 0.21 0.834
Rural ∆ .3025336 .3382536 0.89 0.371
Rural Lag .0092672 .0254853 0.36 0.716
Income ∆ -.000761 .000068 -11.20 0.000
Income Lag -.0000931 .0000458 -2.03 0.042
Observations 334; R-Squared 0.5476
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Table 2: PCSE Model with Measures of all Left
Estimate PCSE t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) .13377 .1425685 0.94 0.348
Educational Attainment ∆ -.0858629 .0235761 -3.64 0.000
Left in Legislature ∆ .0509541 .0414845 1.23 0.219
Left Governor ∆ -.0243887 .0195712 -1.25 0.106
Left Majority ∆ .0102239 .0161434 0.63 0.527
Lula Lag -.0321644 .0108753 -2.96 0.003
Gini ∆ .3507552 .1917968 1.83 0.067
Gini Lag .8281082 .2353169 3.52 0.000
SS/GDP Lag 2.099287 .4762956 4.41 0.000
Education Spending/GDP Lag -1.063728 .4413688 -2.41 0.016
Health Spending/GDP Lag 2.815469 .6910119 4.07 0.000
FPE/GDP Lag .0067581 .1673328 0.04 0.968
Industry ∆ -.2656417 .2414661 -1.10 0.271
Rural Population Lag .2822671 .0420993 6.70 0.000
Income Lag -.0011908 .0000533 -22.36 0.000
GDP Lag 2.66e-10 6.24e-11 4.27 0.000
Observations 334; R-Squared: 0.8409
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Table 1 displays the results from the full error correction model; as previously
outlined, there are two estimates produced for each independent variable: both
short and long-term effect coefficients. As indicated by this table, four disparate
measures of left governance were included in this model,20 only one of which is
significant (a lagged Lula estimate). The first measure for left, ‘Left in Legislature,’
is an accumulated measure of the proportion of seats held by left parties in each
state parliament throughout 1987-2006. ‘Left Governor’ is a cumulative measure
gauging the number of years a left governor was in power during the time period.
The measure for ‘Left Majority’ is also an accumulated measure of the number of
years the left experienced a majority in the state legislature. Finally, the variable
‘Lula’ is a dummy variable measuring whether or not Lula was in the executive.
As stated, Table 1 shows that, of the different measures of left governance,
only a lagged value for Lula is a significant finding. This finding indicates that
left representation in the federal presidency negatively (and significantly) affects
poverty levels in the long-term, and that this effect is distributed over future time
periods. As previously delineated, the coefficient for this lagged term cannot be
interpreted directly; instead, it requires the use of a long-run multiplier (LRM).
The LRM in this case (calculated with a ratio of the Lula lag/poverty lag, or
(β1 / α1)) is .0857 and the speed of adjustment is .9162 (1-.0838), which is (1-
α1). Substantively, this means that the presence of Lula in the previous year
negatively affects poverty in the amount of .0857, which is distributed over future
time periods at the speed of .9162. The finding that Lula is not significant in the
short-term (indicated by ∆) is unsurprising as this simply suggests that Lula is not
immediately impactful against poverty, which one should expect since his flagship
anti-poverty program Bolsa Famı´lia is not likely to see immediate changes, which
20 I also ran several models with various different combinations or exclusions of the different left
variables; however, the results were always the same in that only Lula is a significant predictor.
Therefore, I have included all four measures in this one model to be concise since it does not
change the direction or significance level of any variable. In terms of multicollineary issues,
none of the variables for left governance have VIFs high enough to be a concern. I did also run
models that included only one measure of state left power at a time, (the results of which are
not included in this paper) and the same results displayed in Table 1 were upheld in each.
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is required to achieve significance in the short-term.
Table 1 also shows educational attainment in the short-term to have a signif-
icant, negative impact on poverty trends.21 Interpreting the result for the short-
term (or change in educational attainment) effect is very direct. This result can
be taken to mean that for a one-unit increase in educational attainment, there will
be an immediate change in the poverty rate in the amount of -.0256.
Table 1 also indicates that the gini coefficient is as significant, both in the
long and short-term. The short-term effect (understood as a change in the gini
coefficient) has an immediate impact on poverty in that a one-unit increase in the
gini coefficient (along which higher values means greater inequality) results in an
immedate change in poverty in the amount of .3499. Accordingly, any increase
in income inequality will simultaneously increase poverty in the very short-term.
Table 1 also shows the gini coefficient to have a significant, long-term effect on
poverty trends. The LRM for the gini cofficient lag is 1.8506; substantively, this
means that a one unit increase in the gini coefficient has a total effect on poverty
in the amount of 1.8506, which is distributed over future time periods until the
effect decays (at a rate of .9162). This finding is very telling as it suggests that
a one-unit increase in the gini coefficient (i.e. an increase from .55 to .56) results
in a 1.8506 percent increase in the poverty rate in the long-term. In general, we
can take the results for the gini coefficient to mean that higher income inequality
increases poverty both in the short and long-run.
Also shown in Table 1, the measure for FPE funding (as a percentage of GDP)
is also a significant explantory variable for poverty in the short-term.22 This
21 It is not worrisome that educational attainment is not seen to have a long-term effect on
poverty reduction. As previously described in footnote 9, this variable is an integrated time
series, which necessarily means that this measure is expected to continuously increase and never
retract. As integrated series can only be handled when ‘differenced,’ which means that the most
logical way to interpret the result of an integrated series is to measure the change from one
period to the next in the variable, not to interpret its lagged level.
22 As spending on poverty reduction is typically associated with left governments, one might
expect that this FPE funding would be more effective at reducing poverty if a left government
were in place to control the spending. However, testing the possibility of a significant interaction
effect between FPE/GDP and left governors, as well as FPE/GDP and left majorites, proved to
be fruitless as in neither case was the effect significant.
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indicates that an increase in federal FPE funding results in an immediate decrease
in poverty in the amount of .1532. This is a very encouraging result, as it sug-
gests that federal funding to states can actually be important poverty reduction
measures.
Further, household income is shown to be a significant explantory variable in
both the long- and short-term. The short-term effect indicates that an increase
in household income results in an immediate reduction in poverty in the amount
of -.00076. It is unsurprising that this effect (though significant) is small as the
variable income measures individuals’ or households’ income, whereas poverty is
a measure of the entire poverty-stricken population in the entire state. For the
long-term effect, the LRM for income is .0011, which substantively means that a
one unit increase in household income has a total effect on poverty in the amount
of .0011, which is then distributed over future time periods until the effect decays
(at a speed of adjustment rate .9162). These are encouraging (though not surpris-
ing) findings as they underline that household income is directly related to one’s
likelihood of fallin below the poverty line.
The estimate for industry (which is the percentage of the labor market in
industry) is also shown as a significant determinant of poverty reduction in the
short-term; this finding implies that a positive change upward in the percentage
of the labor force in industry results in an immediate decrease in the poverty
level in the amount of -.3371. This finding is not surprising as industry workers
tend to earn higher wages and are less likely to be in poverty than are agricultural
workers. Accordingly, as more and more people go into industry (and subsequently
earn higher wages), the poverty rates will immediately begin to drop.
Finally, Table 1 shows that a lagged level of poverty, of course, has a significant
impact on poverty; however, this effect is negative. My explanation for this finding
lies in the fact that the dependent variable in an error correction model is itself a
change in poverty. This suggests that higher poverty rates are linked to stronger
efforts to reduce that poverty. In other words, this finding suggests that, if a state
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has a high poverty percentage, efforts will be made to combat that poverty. Also,
this could be a manifestation of Bolsa Famı´lia in that the higher the poverty level
in a given state, the more poverty-stricken individuals there are to receive aid from
this poverty-alleviation program.
Though I do think that an error correction model is the most appropriate for
the purposes of this dataset and model, I also include a more conventional model.
My reasons for doing so are twofold; on the one hand, it enables me to demon-
strate that the results I found from the error correction model are maintained in
a disparate model; also, it allows me to use change in level of poverty as opposed
to a ‘differenced’ value of poverty for my dependent variable. This then enables
me to examine whether or not my variables of interest explain both the trend in
poverty levels, as well as a change in poverty from one period to the next (i.e. a
‘change in change’).
Table 2 displays the results from a more traditional panel-corrected standard
errors model.23 For this model, I had to ‘difference’ years of education and the
left variables as both are cumulative measures. I also chose to ‘difference’ the
gini coefficient (though I also include a lagged gini coefficient) and industry as
I am interested in estimating the short-term effect for both. I included lags of
the remaining variables24 instead of including a ‘differenced’ and lagged measure
for every variable as is required by the error correction model. Also, I include
measures for education and health spending as a percent of GDP and a measure
for state GDP.25
23 Panel-corrected standard error models correct for cross-correlation across units and adjust
the standard errors accordingly (similar to the error-correction model, but not as involved.) This
particular model does not include a lagged level of the dependent variable as an explanatory
variable, as this is argued by some to soak up too much of the variance (Achen 2000).
24 It makes theoretical sense to include lags of the variables because it is likely the case that
there is a time lag before their impact takes place. For example, it is important to lag socal
spending because it probably takes at least one time period before the effect of spending on
poverty can occur.
25 As previously explained, these are variables which I would like to have used in the error-
correction model but multicollinearity was a problem for each (with VIF scores greater than
10). However, multicollinearity was not found to be a problem for any variable in the second
model. This is unsurprising as the error-correction model necessitates that each variable is
included twice, thereby increasing the chances for multicollinearity problems. Finally, I have
run both the error correction and panel-corrected standard error models with and without these
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As demonstrated by Table 2, several additional variables jump in as significant
explanatory variables. The most important finding from this model, for this study,
is that the results for educational attainment and a leftist executive president
were maintained. Also consistent with the error-correction model, none of the
subnational left power variables are significant findings. This model provides more
support for my findings, thus suggesting that my results are robust. In addition to
educational attainment and Lula, income inequality (both in the short and long-
term), social security/welfare spending, education spending, health spending, rural
population, income, and GDP are all returned as significant in this model.
It is unsurprising that these variables are significant in one model and not the
other, as the dependent variable for the disparate models are measuring different
phenomenon. The dependent variable in the error correction model measures
change in poverty, whereas the panel-corrected standard error model measures
a change in the level of poverty. From the results between the two models, I
conclude that the findings of most interest to me (educational attainment and
Lula) are robust findings and explain both change in poverty and change in the
level of poverty. To explain why several additional variables are significant in the
second model, I assume that certain variables explain an immediate change in
poverty whereas others explain change in level of poverty.
Discussion and Conclusion
The findings for education clearly support my hypothesis that a change upward in
average years of education has a significant, negative impact on poverty. This is
not a surprising result as prior research has established that investments in human
capital of this sort can assist in lifting people out of poverty through increasing the
productivity of the labor force and subsequently increasing wages (among other
positive effects). The importance of education for the population’s income levels,
three variables. In each case, the findings were maintained; however, it is best to exclude these
variables from the error-correction model as protocol suggests a VIF of 10 is too high.
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as well as economic growth in general, is further highlighted with the Bolsa Famı´lia
program. Monetary benefits for this program were conditional on evidence that the
children in the qualifying households had at least an 85 percent school attendance
rate (Kingstone and Power 2008). This suggests that the Brazilian government is
becoming aware that in order to sustain economic growth and continuosly decrease
poverty, investments in human capital are necessary.
Brazil is a highly decentralized country as outlined previously; however, my
findings indicate that the power of left parties at the governor and state parlia-
ment levels in the face of poverty is drastically reduced in this time period due to
the presence of either a left president or Bolsa Famı´lia. The results indicate that
a left president has a more significant impact on poverty reduction than accumu-
lated left power in the state legislatures, rule by left governors, or the presence of
left majorities in state legislatures. It might certainly be the case that the power
of the federal government is weakened by the states in some policy arenas as a
result of the decentralized nature of the country; however, this has not been the
trend with poverty in recent years, as President Lula has been able to circumvent
the state governments and implement a near-universal, successful policy reduction
program (Bolsa Famı´lia). For example, Tracy Fenwick, in her article “Avoiding
Governors: the Success of Bolsa Famı´lia,” advances the argument that President
Lula was successul in his implementation of Bolsa Famı´lia precisely because he was
able to circumvent the state governors and parliaments and instead fully enact the
family stipend program directly to the municipal and individual level. The presi-
dent defied existing theories of the serious constraints of Brazil’s decentralization
and was able to establish a relationship between the federal government and the
citizens by cutting out the participation of the states and instead direct Bolsa
Famı´lia’s implementation at the municipal level (Fenwick 2009). Fenwick makes
clear in this article that the “biggest losers in Bolsa Famı´lia were the twenty-seven
states that the federal government cut out by building and expanding on federal
poverty-alleviation without their involvement....Bolsa Famı´lia bypasses state-level
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involvement” (Fenwick 2009, 117-118).
Though the findings indicate that left governance at the state level takes a
backseat to Lula, it is probably the case that state legislators and governors are
effective for poverty reductive in other ways. For instance, a simple correlation test
reveals that the measures for educational attainment and legislative left power are
correlated at a level of .5494.26 This suggests that left parties at the state level
might very well be important for education and subsequently indirectly important
for poverty reduction. Regardless, though my hypothesis that left governance at
the state level would have a powerful effect on poverty reduction is not supported,
it is still a positive and encouraging finding that a left president in Brazil can have
a significant impact on lowering poverty.
In conclusion, I have demonstrated with this paper that higher average levels
of education are essential for poverty reduction efforts through improving the hu-
man capital of the population and subsequently increasing the productivity of the
labor force. Also, left governance is important for decreasing poverty, though not
directly at the state level. The results indicate that what has been important for
poverty alleviation is a left president in power in Brazil. However, as previously
outlined, it is difficult to decipher whether this finding is due to a left president in
general or is specific to President Lula as he has implemented a successful poverty
alleviation program which has reached its target of 11.1 million poor people. Also,
Lula is the only president that can be coded as ‘left’ since Brazil’s democratization
and as such there are not other left presidents to compare this result to. To con-
clude, it is essential for Brazil to “continue to strengthen the social safety net, as
particularly targeted conditional cash transfers (Bolsa Famı´lia) can have a signif-
icant effect on poverty alleviation, improve the progressiveness of public transfers
and income distribution in the short run, while emphasizing the importance of
human capital investments for sustainable poverty reduction” (IADB 2005, 34).
26 The correlation matrix for this model is not included as space was a concern with 15 variables;




The findings from this study suggest several avenues for future research. Specif-
ically, these results could only be enhanced with a more direct investigation of
Brazil’s decentralization structure. A more complete dataset including quantita-
tive measures of total federal transfers to the states will strengthen any studies
examining subnational Brazil. Additionally, the results from this study run counter
to numerous arguments in the literature which maintain that Brazil’s state gov-
ernments have consistently constrained the center; subsequently, it would be in-
teresting to push this study further in order to really examine subnational politics
in Brazil. Finally, and most importantly, Brazil’s decentralized education system
deserves a closer examination. As detailed previously, Brazilian subnational gov-
ernments have the largest responsibilities with education; however, “as a result
of the retreat of the center and the lack of intergovernmental coordination, Brazil
[has] continued to lag behind its neighbors in educational development; school
failure and drop-out remained at very high levels, and, by the early 1990s, Brazil
had one of the worst education performances in Latin America...only Haiti had a
lower primary school completion rate” (Borges 2008, 238). This argument high-
lights negative effects of a decentralized education system and, as I have hopefully
elucidated, education is exceptionally important for poverty reduction. These two




Table 3: Federal FPE Funding to States as a Percentage of States’ GDP
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Acre 0.12120 0.07439 0.26549 0.24478 0.22861
Alagoas 0.02953 0.07085 0.07958 0.08489 0.08839
Amapa´ 0.00000 0.08395 0.17152 0.23140 0.23437
Amazonas 0.01416 0.01860 0.01959 0.02679 0.02502
Bahia 0.01119 0.02537 0.02707 0.02096 0.03097
Ceara´ 0.02899 0.05498 0.04532 0.05055 0.05374
Distrito Federal 0.00121 0.00714 0.00584 0.00334 0.00257
Esp´ırito Santo .0.00645 0.01098 0.00898 0.00999 0.00952
Goia´s 0.01045 0.00699 0.01845 0.0188 0.01687
Maranha¨o 0.06143 0.10978 0.11009 0.1124 0.0855
Mato Grosso 0.02137 0.03355 0.02737 0.02468 0.01844
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.00969 0.01684 0.01471 0.01605 0.01839
Mi.s Gerais 0.00526 0.00582 0.00546 0.00602 0.00691
Para´ 0.02197 0.02569 0.03837 0.04635 0.04683
Para´ıba 0.04592 0.06875 0.06945 0.07429 0.08488
Parana´ 0.00218 0.00551 0.00579 0.00626 0.00681
Pernambuco 0.02056 0.03149 0.03045 0.03398 0.04143
Piau´ı 0.06695 0.11690 0.10495 0.11621 0.11663
Rio de Janeiro 0.00192 0.00171 0.00181 0.00135 0.00186
Rio Grande do Norte 0.03307 0.07059 0.06825 0.06443 0.06992
Rio Grande do Sul 0.00256 0.00351 0.00339 0.00397 0.00489
Rondoˆnia 0.0000 0.051701 0.07038 0.07174 0.06539
Roraima .14214 0.01578 0.40807 0.27164 0.23375
Santa Catarina 0.00342 0.00416 0.00419 0.00433 0.00449
Sa˜o Paulo 0.00032 0.00033 0.00034 0.00038 0.00041
Sergipe 0.02749 0.08771 0.09084 0.10059 0.09289
Tocantins N/A 0.33307 0.27333 0.21626 0.15232
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Poverty 560 .3822585 .1783312 .0135433 .7907487
Gini Coefficient 560 .5688629 .0421962 .3944586 .6664805
Left in Leg. 551 .3082008 .1708543 0 .7916667
Cum. Left in Leg. 551 2.776884 2.364442 0 11.06532
Cum. PT Weight 551 .6887246 .6988081 0 3.610942
Cum. Left Maj. 551 1.357532 2.83503 0 17
Left Governor 551 .3666062 .4823155 0 1
Income 560 291.6018 123.5657 90.28869 823.4935
SS/GDP 590 .0193205 .0546833 0 1.274805
Education/GDP 590 .0377215 .0559419 0 1.137979
Health/GDP 590 .0223917 .0354309 0 .6256148
Years of Ed. 533 5.072853 1.346823 2.031395 9.216916
Industry 560 .1006357 .046958 .0283074 .2805103
Percent Rural 641 .2742521 .1223554 .0259673 .6516445
Lula 648 .2083333 .4064302 0 1
FPE/GDP 590 .056409 .0753212 0 .4224022
Income 560 291.6018 123.5657 90.28869 823.4935
GDP 590 2.79e+07 7.66e+07 .0003201 8.03e+08
39
Table 5: VIF scores for ECM Model
VIF 1/VIF
Income Lag 8.91 0.112171
Years of Education Lag 7.24 0.138140
Left in Legislature Lag 7.24 0.138182
Poverty Lag 6.70 0.149203
Left in Legislature ∆ 4.59 0.217664
Left Governor Lag 4.02 0.248660
Lula ∆ 3.45 0.290042
Rural Lag 3.19 0.313770
Lula Lag 2.79 0.358506
Left Majorities Lag 2.69 0.371206
Gini Lag 2.44 0.409808
Left Majorities ∆ 2.38 0.420046
Left Governor ∆ 2.11 0.473956
Industry Lag 2.10 0.476650
FPE/GDP Lag 1.86 0.537128
Gini ∆ 1.72 0.581243
Income ∆ 1.56 0.640097
Years of Education ∆ 1.29 0.775772
SS/GDP Lag 1.26 0.791766
Rural ∆ 1.23 0.810069
FPE/GDP ∆ 1.13 0.882163
SS/GDP ∆ 1.11 0.902050
Industry ∆ 1.07 0.936195
Mean VIF 3.13
Table 6: VIF scores for PCSE Model
VIF 1/VIF
Health Spending/GDP Lag 7.46 0.133976
Education Spending/GDP Lag 6.24 0.160147
FPE/GDP Lag 5.27 0.189629
Left in Legislature ∆ 3.53 0.283109
Rural Lag 2.77 0.360726
Income Lag 2.65 0.376765
Left Majorities 2.07 0.482839
Gini Lag 1.93 0.517420
Lula ∆ 1.79 0.558374
Left Governor ∆ 1.74 0.575792
GDP Lag 1.59 0.629588
Gini ∆ 1.57 0.638114
SS/GDP Lag 1.18 0.846799
Years of Education ∆ 1.07 0.933422
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